

Routes to tour in Germany The German Holiday Route – from the Alps to the Baltic



German roads will get you there, and if you plan to see as much as you can, why not travel the length of the country? From the Alpine foothills in the south via the typical Mittelgebirge range to the plains of the north, you will pass through the most varied landscapes. And so you needn't take pot luck in deciding on a route, we recommend the German Holiday Route from the Alps to the Baltic.




Start in the south with Berchtesgaden and its bob run. Maybe you have already heard tell of Landshut, a mediaeval Bavarian town with the world's largest brick-and-mortar tower. Or of Erbach in the Odenwald, with its castle and the Ivory Museum. Or of Alsfeld with its half-timbered houses, the Harz mountain towns or the 1,000-year-old Hanseatic port of Lübeck.

Visit Germany and let the Holiday Route be your guide – from the Alps to the Baltic.

- 1 Lübeck
- 2 Melsungen
- 3 Schwäbisch Hall
- 4 Berchtesgaden



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DEPOSE A BRX X

IMF and World Bank not quite the villains of the piece

Studdeutsche Zeitung

Few of the critics of the IMF and the World Bank, which are meeting in Berlin, know what they are talking about, but that doesn't stop them from talking.

To hear them, you would think the delegates are nothing but the worst kind of evildoers from all over the world, people whose impenetrable financial machinations are aimed at prolonging the colonial era.

The opposite is the case. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were set up in Bretton Woods in 1944 to help.

They lend, and partly give away, money earned by working people in the industrialised countries, as opposed to those who for years have preached, from comfortable academic chairs, the merits of a new economic order.

What they preach tends to foster fond illusions that we are living in a land flowing with milk and honey in which the pennies fall from heaven.

The present economic system may not be the best, but it does at least still

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Once upon a time there was Little Mo, Rod the Rocket and Steffi

work, and that is largely to the credit of the IMF and the World Bank.

No-one who fails to mind the experience in the late 1920s as a result of which the two organisations were set up will for one moment regret their existence.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s nearly every country had to crack down on imports for lack of foreign exchange, each stalling the other and triggering a worldwide depression.

This has not been repeated, and the system even survived last October's stock market crash.

That isn't to say that the financial experts have made no mistakes. But they aren't the only ones. The loan donors and recipients who are so busy lamenting the debt crisis would do well to remember that they themselves are mainly to blame.

The developing countries have irresponsibly accepted loans provided, equally irresponsibly, by the donor banks.

The IMF and the World Bank were often disregarded in these transactions – largely because they are statutorily obliged to take a closer look at conditions and terms.

The Berlin meeting cannot solve the sovereign debt problem. Costly jumbo sessions of this kind, the sense and purpose of which are open to dispute, are

handing payments crises, is far from insignificant. Yet aid has for years been channelled in the wrong direction, neglecting trade and agriculture and concentrating on building industrial complexes. This may in many cases have been in keeping with what the developing countries themselves wanted.

The Rourkela steelworks in Bihar, India was an early symbol of this mistaken approach, which has since been abandoned.

In its day, however, it was given preference by emerging states keen on steelworks, dams, airlines and suchlike prestige objects.

They too have since learnt their lesson, paying a high price in terms of finance.

Help to self-help is the basis of development aid today, and rightly so. But the World Bank badly needs new funds to be able to finance it.

It is regrettable that the United States, itself now the world's most heavily indebted country, has seen fit to stall on the generous increase in World Bank capital recommended by most other industrialised countries.

As Washington's viewpoint is unlikely to be revised before the US Presidential elections the Berlin meeting is unlikely to arrive at specific decisions.

Much the same is true of the IMF. Given the international economic difficulties with structural adjustment, its paid-up capital ought long to have been increased. But here too the Americans are stalling.

As the IMF generally makes its loans subject to economic policy commitments it has been decried as a kind of international economic police force. It is nothing of the kind.

The IMF is duty bound to make sure that its loans – usually short-term, five-year bridging loans and not development aid loans – can be repaid, which ought surely to be a matter of course.

Its activities have been realigned since exchange rates have floated and it has no longer needed to make sure that fixed exchange rates are upheld.

It is now both a provider of loans and a coordinator of the debt crisis, which is a far cry from its original role.

It must also bear in mind the volatile flow of international capital, which is now on the move day and night as a result of state-of-the-art telecom technology.

Capital movements have long parted company with the flow of goods and services, both in pace and in extent, which partly accounts for fluctuations in the dollar's exchange rate.


For this reason alone the IMF is keen to devise ways and means of ascertaining when an economy is going off the rails. Some such coordinating system could do no harm even if it were to lead only to observation and not to intervention.

In this case the IMF would indeed perform the rôle of a world policeman – on the industrialised countries' behalf.

But this surveillance theory must not be allowed to assume the importance that was attached in the 1970s to the locomotive theory, according to which a single leading industrialised country could lead the pack by pump-priming.

Flexible exchange rates since 1973 have fluctuated more than many might expect. *Liselotte Miller*, *Frankfurter Neue Presse*, 19 September 1988

Continued on page 9



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WORLD AFFAIRS

Gorbachov and risks of the German card

Mr Gorbachov and his aides have yet to more than vaguely hint at what "new thinking" and "European house" mean, and how they would affect Germany.

It is clear that the Soviet leader views two theories as past history. One is the Soviet tenet that two nations now exist in the part of Europe once known as Germany.

The other is the idea that the only form the German Question takes is the one that was resolved in the treaties signed between 1970 and 1972.

"Everything is in a state of flux," Soviet officials now say, and history alone will tell what the situation will be in 100 years' time.

In the West this comment sounds like an ironic commentary on militant Marxist-Leninist rhetoric about the wheel of history. In the East it is more than mere speculation; it shows that the situation is being reappraised.

Nations, and with them the division of Germany, are a reality — or so "new thinking" would have it.

Further realities are the successful and continuing economic and political integration of Western Europe and the role played by the Americans in Europe as guarantors of security from Canada to Helsinki.

If realism and withdrawal from overextended commitments are characteristic of the methodical approach of "new thinking" — and the Afghanistan treaty and a new, pragmatic approach toward Israel and South Africa indicate that they are — then it is hard to imagine the Soviet Union ignoring the German Question.

Both history and geography rule out any idea of a Russian ruler disregarding Germany as the key to Europe.

Since Peter the Great, Catherine the Great and Alexander I, Russia has seen Germany as of crucial importance for both the projection of Russian power in Central Europe and for Russia's Imperial security and sense of self-importance.

The Brest Litovsk peace terms dictated to the Soviet Union in 1918 and the 1922 Rapallo treaty between the pariahs of Europe may have opened a new chapter, but subject to conditions that were the same as of old.

Both Russia and Germany were opposed to the West, and never more markedly than in the two years of the unlikely alliance of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, signed in 1939 and operative until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941.

Stalin used to see an undivided Germany as the prerequisite for Soviet domination of Europe as a whole. But in 1945 he only gained control over half the country.

East Germany formed part of the policy of maintaining control over the western provinces of the Soviet empire and, once Western Europe had joined forces in Nato, was used against America as a hostage whenever an East-West crisis occurred.

The Soviet Union succeeded in consolidating this. What it now has in mind is the most important item on the agenda of world affairs.

Is it still intent on making Western

Europe part of its sphere of influence by means of denuclearisation, displacement of the Americans and forcible canvassing of support?

Or is Moscow's aim to ensure long-term stability of the status quo and to maintain peace and quiet on the Western front?

Apart from the United States, no country carries greater weight in this connection than the Federal Republic of Germany.

Bilateral ties between Moscow and Bonn remain dependent on relations between America and Russia.

They also depend on a definition of interests the Soviet Union has concealed rather than clarified by its "European house" concept — and on relations between Moscow and East Berlin.

There is no prospect of a fresh version of the 1952 note in which Stalin offered Germany reunification in return for neutrality.

Anyone with expectations to the contrary has succumbed to the legend that Stalin's note was an opportunity not to be missed.

A Soviet leader who seriously proposes to play the German card must surely be doomed to failure on grounds of adventurism. Khrushchev's fall has not been forgotten.

Alternatively there must be a major European realignment under Soviet suzerainty, which the West cannot permit and the Germans can hardly want.

In either case it would mean Moscow surrendering East Germany, with unforeseeable consequences for Poland and Czechoslovakia that would be sure to step up unrest among Soviet nationalities. That too can hardly be expected to happen.

Unless, that is, the West were to make counter-concessions such as calling a halt to European integration and with-

Frankfurter Allgemeine

drawing US forces from Berlin and elsewhere, which the West could hardly consider desirable.

If substantial, long-term alternatives between these two extremes are conceivable, they have yet to be shown to exist.

In point of fact the Soviet leaders are not ignoring the German Question; they have merely subordinated it to nuclear issues and thereby set it reverberating.

As a nuclear superpower and by being in a position to step up or slow down the pace of arms control the Soviet Union has other means of safely arranging its affairs in concert with the United States.

Yet Germany played a major role in medium-range missile disarmament and will continue to do so in all further moves toward conventional and nuclear arms control in Europe.

Soviet arms control diplomacy in Europe will only be done justice if it is seen as bearing the German Question in mind.

That is the true but unlisted agenda of relations between Bonn and Moscow. Their manner and framework must be developed so as to balance the military might of the East against the economic potential of the West.

Only then can predictability and stability be ensured in Central Europe, and only then can Germany be sure of leverage for negotiation and of carrying political weight.

Michael Stürmer
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
für Deutschland, 10 September 1988)

Moscow manoeuvres to gain an upper hand in Asia

The plan for Asia Mr Gorbachov outlined in Krasnoyarsk at the end of his tour of Siberia rounds off his attempts to stage a diplomatic offensive to ease domestic pressure.

His plan for the Far East and the Pacific perimeter of the Soviet empire goes into greater detail on Gorbachov's speech in Vladivostok in July 1986 and is characteristic of the consistency and confidence of Soviet foreign policy.

In place of threatening gestures, relations with the United States, Europe and now Asia are governed by flexible diplomacy on the basis of negotiations and with the appearance of being able to compromise.

It does pose a challenge to the United States as a naval power, and a challenge by non-naval means that is far from easy to answer because the nucleus of the Soviet plan is anything but a mere military tit-for-tat.

The Soviet naval base in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and the US naval and air bases in the Philippines are the largest either superpower maintains outside its own borders.

They are of symbolic importance for the political presence of both in the region.

Mr Gorbachov's proposal for each side to shut down its respective bases has the propagandist advantage of being a gracious and apparently straightforward arrangement. It is touted as a potential gift to the Asian nations assembled in Seoul for the Olympic Games.

Nominally Tokyo is not allowed to spend more than one per cent of GNP on defence, but in effect defence spending has doubled over the past four years due to Japan's enormous economic growth and the revaluation of the yen.

Japan is now one of the five largest defense spenders in the world, investing roughly as much as Britain, France or the Federal Republic of Germany.

Its military equipment, especially its fleet, is extremely advanced — in keeping with Japanese industrial standards — and starting to cause alarm in the Pacific that Moscow has been quick to put to use.

Last but not least, a keynote of the Gorbachov Plan is an interest in harnessing the swiftly-growing economic and financial power of advanced and advancing Asian countries for Soviet development projects.

Under America's protecting hand, they have regained self-assurance and have either been economically successful, like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the ASEAN states, or are making economic progress, such as China.

The protection of the American military presence is no longer welcomed as a matter of course. At times, it is felt even to be a burden.

Import restrictions, nuclear policy and the extensive system of nuclear bases have drawn criticism from Australia to the Philippines and Japan.

Mr Gorbachov's aim is to make astute psychological use of this trend.

Otherwise, he has nothing much to offer with which to gain a foothold in the Far East.

He offers his services as an understanding aide against American hegemonic power by proposing, in a soft and gentle voice, a freeze in nuclear naval potential in the region.

He also is calling for safety measures to prevent land and air incidents and has revived the Brezhnev plan to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

Conferences held by the various groups of states are to promote the security policy process.

Heribert Krempp
(Die Welt, Bonn, 21 September 1988)

Vietnamese are beginning to withdraw, partly due to famine in Indo-China (as reported in the latest FAO foodgrain report) and partly due to Soviet pressure.

A second point of emphasis is Japan. In talks with the former Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Nakasone, in July, Mr Gorbachov hinted that Moscow might be prepared to hold negotiations on the return and demilitarisation of the four Kurile islands it has held since 1945.

High-ranking Soviet visitors to Japanese research facilities and the Japanese Socialist Party have made similar hints. The Soviet Union occupied the Kurile islands at the end of World War II and Japan has never tired of saying that any improvement in relations between Tokyo and Moscow must depend on their return.

During Mr Gromyko's tenure as Foreign Minister Soviet diplomats steadfastly refused even to discuss the issue, effectively preventing a rapprochement.

A major reason for Mr Gorbachov's interest in Japan is Tokyo's increasing arms build-up. Despite their constitutional restrictions the Japanese self-defence forces have been increased substantially in recent years.

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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Does the (single-market) chicken come before the (monetary union) egg?

A fair amount of scepticism surrounds the Delors Commission's efforts in Brussels to get to grips with the disputed issues of monetary union and a central European bank.

The 15-man committee, comprising the heads of central banks and a few specialists, was set up at the summit conference in Hanover earlier this year.

The committee, chaired by Jacques Delors, president of the Commission, should have a report to issue by next spring.

Heads of government will discuss at further steps at the next European summit in Madrid next June.

The issues of monetary union and a central bank are causing extreme differences of opinion.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has, as usual, given her opinion without frills. After the Hanover summit, she told a reporter: "There will not be a European central bank as long as I live." Neither would there certainly be agreement on a European government which would be a prerequisite for a European central bank.

Her sharp No to French ideas about Europe's currency future indicated that Mrs Thatcher regards these as in line with the recommendations made by Bundesbank president Karl Otto Pöhl, outlined in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 28 May.

Apparently Delors favours Pöhl's ideas, and it is probably correct to assume that they are playing a certain role in the opening phases of the consultations.

At the same time the fears of many currency experts in the Federal Republic, that the economically strongest country in the

Differences of opinion have emerged over one of the most important points in the Single European Market by the end of 1992: indirect taxation (principally Value Added Tax and customs duties).

This has become apparent from statements by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, and French Prime Minister Michel Rocard.

This bodies ill for the goal of getting rid of frontiers between states.

It was already obvious to experts that, apart from the opposition which interior ministers would put up on security grounds, their colleagues in finance ministries would throw up the most difficult hurdles before internal frontiers within the European Community could be dismantled.

The Commission's priority aim was not taxation policy at all, but a minimum harmonisation, which would permit getting rid of frontiers without severe distortions in competition.

The Commission had proposed two VAT rates: Member-states would be entitled to a spread of between 14 and 20 per cent for the standard rate and between four and nine per cent for the concessionary rate.

The current concept of giving VAT relief on exports and imposing taxes on imports would be abolished.

Instead exporters would charge VAT and would have to remit the balance to their tax authority after deducting justifiable expenses and tax relief to which they are entitled as part of the VAT system.

A clearing house system would be set up to balance national accounts.

The bases of assessment for customs duties on cigarettes, tobacco, alcohol and oil would be standardised and the rates aligned.

Britain now wants to retain frontier

Pöhl's ideas also included the demand that the Community central bank must approve financing national deficits by printing money.

This is also not a matter of course in all member states. To many it seems that "the convergence of priorities" in a future European currency system would be more important than the alignment of economic and financial policies that is continuously being talked about.

There is nothing new in this for the Community. At The Hague summit conference 19 years ago the heads of government called for economic and currency union and entrusted a commission to clarify the technical details.

Under the chairmanship of the then Luxembourg Prime Minister, Pierre Werner, experts recommended a graduated plan in 1970 that extended from a gradual reduction in the spread of the fluctuations of Community currencies to coordination of central bank intervention and the establishment of a "Community body under the management of central bank presidents."

Two demands of the Werner Plan were fulfilled with the European Monetary System, and the creation of the Ecu, even if they only include certain members of the Community and do not always function to everyone's satisfaction.

There is considerable dispute about further steps, particularly the transitional phase of a "parallel currency" and the establishment of a reserve fund.

It is also questionable whether a central decision-making committee is necessary.

But there is one point on which all are agreed: the experts and politicians should not let themselves be pressured into coming to a quick decision.

They will not do that anyway. And in this expectation there is the hope of a lone deliberative process.

Currency union is a mirage — seen only in the distance.

Peter Hora
(*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*
für Deutschland, 13 September 1988)

controls on the grounds of internal security and for health reasons, and just simplify taxation.

When imports and exports are deregulated among EC countries the market will tend to ensure that VAT rates are standardised.

In France the

Left-wing terrorists claimed responsibility for an attempt to assassinate a key civil servant at the Bonn Finance Ministry days before the Berlin meeting of the IMF and the World Bank. They cynically "apologised" for their failure, saying the firing mechanism of their sub-machine gun had jammed.

News of the attempt to kill Hans Tietmeyer, one of Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg's two permanent state secretaries and a right-hand man to successive Economic Affairs and Finance Ministers in Bonn, was broken at a Press conference in the capital.

It was 10 a.m. and Herr Stoltenberg began by saying that at 8.30 a.m., Herr Tietmeyer just stepped into his Ministry car on his way to work from Bad Godesberg, a Bonn suburb, and travelled barely 50 yards when unknown assailants opened fire from a copse.

As the Minister revealed details of the terrorist assassination bid before going on to international economic growth and the Third World debt crisis, both key topics at the Berlin meeting, an evidently unperturbed Dr Tietmeyer had already left the scene of the attack and started his day's work.

The assailants escaped unharmed too, and on the day of the assassination bid, 20 September, there was no clue to their identity or purpose, although Herr Stoltenberg said it must presumably be seen in connection with the Berlin meeting.

But, as always on such occasions, chief public prosecutor Kurt Rehmann and his staff immediately took charge of the investigations, and a day later an anonymous letter was received from person or persons claiming to have been to blame.

Were they members of the RAF, or Red

TERRORIST MURDER BID FAILS

Ambush believed linked with IMF, World Bank meeting

Army Faction, a German urban guerrilla group of left-wing terrorists who were mainly active in the 1970s?

Or were the would-be killers members of militant smaller "autonomous" units, either or both aiming to strike yet another blow at the imperialist economic system?

Rehmann immediately assumed that "autonomous" militants must be to blame, especially as masked assailants armed with sticks had broken up a debate on the IMF in Hamburg the previous evening.

It is hard to imagine the RAF using shotguns, as the Godesberg assailants did. But the RAF was just as keen on breaking up the Berlin meeting.

The attempt on the life of a man whose name is closely associated with the World Bank and the IMF would be consistent with the aims of the RAF.

Dr Tietmeyer's rise began when he, a Christian Democrat, energetically disputed claims made by Social Democratic Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Karl Schäffer at an election meeting.

Free Democratic Economic Affairs Ministers Hans Friderichs and Otto Lambsdorff also appreciated his advice.

Under SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, he was a head of department at the Economic Affairs Ministry and agreed to be the Social and Free Democratic coalition's key adviser on cyclical policy.

He is reputed to have advised Count Lambsdorff on the policy report that triggered the break-up of the SPD-FDP coalition.

in September 1982. When the Christian Democrats were returned to power in Stoltenberg had Dr Tietmeyer transferred from the Economic Affairs Ministry.

At the Finance Ministry he was put in charge of finance policy fundamentals, of financial relations within the European Community framework, of monetary, money and credit policy and of much, much more.

Nearly all paperwork in connection with national and international conferences is cleared via his desk, and when Chancellor Kohl makes a government policy statement on monetary matters, Herr Tietmeyer can be sure to have been instrumental in drafting it.

He stands in for Herr Stoltenberg at the Club of Ten or in Brussels when the Minister is either unable or unwilling to attend.

As deputy governor of the World Bank he was also in charge of preparations for the Berlin meeting of the IMF and the World Bank.

The more competitive and authoritative he is, the more influential a senior civil servant so close to such important levers of power will be.

Finance experts grudgingly acknowledge Herr Tietmeyer as a brilliant economist most keenly committed to his work.



Survived attack and went back to work... Hans Tietmeyer.

(Photo: Steen Simon)

Some have described him as incredibly hard-working, others as a workaholic. Many who have been associated with him or asked his advice will agree that the organiser of this year's IMF and World Bank meeting has the unusual combination of a brilliant mind and a practical ability to get things done.

He also seems to have strong nerves. Before driving off to work he told the police the weapon that had just been used might well have been a shotgun.

He said the bullets hit the car but did not penetrate the sheet metal.

*Udo Bergdoll
(Süddeutsche Zeitung,
Munich, 21 September 1988)*

Discarded machine gun stolen in Red Army Faction raid

Security authorities changed their minds within hours about the attempt to assassinate Hans Tietmeyer, 57, state secretary at the Federal Finance Ministry.

They first thought the unknown assailants' intention had merely been to frighten Herr Tietmeyer and people attending the Berlin IMF and World Bank meeting.

The attack had been staged in such a dillitante fashion that the Red Army Faction (RAF) was apparently ruled out as the culprit.

But then the weapon was found at the scene of the crime. It was identified as one of several stolen when the RAF raided a gun dealer's in Maxdorf, near Ludwigshafen.

An official engaged in the investigation put it: "We then knew we were dealing with an RAF group." The anonymous letter claiming responsibility for the attack merely underscored the point.

What was intended to happen? The authorities are working on two possible lines of approach:

- Herr Tietmeyer and his driver were to have been killed, but a sub-machine gun the assailants had with them jammed. This interpretation is supported by the full sub-machine gun magazine found at the scene of the crime.

- Their aim was to abduct Herr Tietmeyer. Arguments that lend weight to this possibility are that the gun was aimed low, at the body and tyres of the car.

The assailants' intention could have been to hit the car's tyres and the two men's legs, thus immobilising them and making it easier to abduct them.

In recent years security experts have argued that hostage-taking is unlikely, the abduction of Hanns-Martin Schleyer in 1977 having shown that Bonn will not

yield to blackmail. Besides, so many RAF terrorists have been taken into custody in recent years that Germany's left-wing urban guerrillas are no longer thought to have the manpower they need to stage such an operation.

The four-page letter claiming responsibility for the attack is in two parts. The first explains, on behalf of an RAF Khaled Aker Command, that the attack was carried out in connection with the Berlin IMF and World Bank meeting.

The second is a joint declaration by the RAF and the Italian *Brigate Rosse*, or Red Brigades.

Differences in origin, development and objectives of the RAF and the Red Brigades must no longer, it said, stand in the way of their joint anti-imperialist struggle.

The security authorities have noted for over a year that the RAF is keen to enlist Red Brigade support, but the Italian terrorists had seemed to keep their distance from the RAF.

The joint declaration now indicates that a common basis has now been found," an official says. Yet there is no specific evidence that Italians had anything to do with the Bonn raid.

The experts were still unsure whether further moves might be expected. "Whenever the police are working flat-out the terrorists go to ground," an official said: "They have always done so in the past."

"But after the failure of their attempt to assassinate Herr Tietmeyer they may now be under especially heavy pressure to succeed. We must work on the assumption that they still have something planned."

Horst Zimmermann
(Bromer Nachrichten, 22 September 1988)

Politics at first hand

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Profession

Rolf Dahrendorf, who wrote this article for the national weekly, *Die Zeit*, is a former head of the London School of Economics. He is now Professor of Sociology at Constance University.

No-one needs reminding that our friends and neighbours are somewhat surprised by the re-emergence of German questions they have long dismissed as over and done with.

Even Central Europe is an issue fraught with uncertainties. Can one refer to a new "romanticism of the Third Way," to quote Hans-Ulrich Wehler?

Is Central Europe to be seen as a "common house" furnished by the Germans? Does it stand for a parting of the ways with the West that calls to mind embarrassments of old?

Or, quite differently, is Eastern Europe to be invited to join a "permitted" semi-West?

André Glucksmann is by no means alone in having written about the anxiety to which such speculation gives rise in France.

In the English-speaking West and in countries that go along with it brawls tend to be furrowed about what the restless Germans are up to again.

Issues of this kind form part of the background to questions Germans are asked that are much more specific, if posed less often.

Maybe Germans who are frequent travellers and whose opposite numbers occasionally forget where they come from are more familiar with these other questions.

They too deal with an aspect of German nationalism, but are likelier to be related to economic than to political issues.

"Germans" people will say whatever members made of larger markets or of international cooperation. "Ah yes, it's all different there!"

The Federal Republic of Germany is seen by many as the Japan of Europe, with an impenetrable defence line of partly cultural, partly institutional peculiarities.

In one respect some see the Federal Republic as even worse than Japan. The Japanese are felt, at least under Premier Nakasone, and even more markedly under Premier Takeshita, to have begun to boost domestic demand so as to reduce export surpluses (so people say).

That is seen as a contribution toward international economic stabilisation that is deserving of meritorious mention.

It leaves only the Federal Republic still viewing its balance-of-payments surplus as a virility symbol, pointing in only one direction: upward.

The Federal Republic, in comparison, is still reeling under the trauma of the last-but-one Bonn economic summit.

In this connection mention must be made of the question why the Federal Republic has derived so little benefit from the fully-fledged 1980s boom.

Growth rates need not be on a par with those of, say, Spain or Portugal, but how does Germany compare with Britain or France?

PERSPECTIVE

Time for the Germans to answer some questions

The Germans are seen as not being prepared to discuss making a contribution of their own toward striking an international economic balance.

Even Central Europe is an issue fraught with uncertainties. Can one refer to a new "romanticism of the Third Way," to quote Hans-Ulrich Wehler?

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Growth rates need not be on a par with those of, say, Spain or Portugal, but how does Germany compare with Britain or France?

"You simply can't get a foot on the ground in Germany," foreign entrepreneurs say. This comes as a surprise to Germans who feel they buy virtually nothing but imported goods.

Maybe this impression belies the real market share held by imported goods — just as it fails to reflect the difficulties foreigners see in trying to gain a foothold in the German market.

It seems to follow rules and a logic of its own, yet in reality it isn't a separate market but a strange blend of market forces and powers.

This definition is made advisedly. Part of the singularity of the German situation is not organised; it is due to cultural considerations.

The same, incidentally, is true of Japan and, unquestionably, of other European countries.

A Württemberg artisan would be ill-advised to call on his customers driving a Japanese car, while industry — even without government slogans — tends to prefer German bids.

German managers of the German subsidiaries of foreign companies at times feel they need to "apologise" to friends and colleagues for their "display" in not working for a German firm.

From the viewpoint of other countries there are non-tariff barriers that can be eliminated neither by negotiation nor by experience. So in this respect, as in others, Germany is different.

Maybe it is an exaggeration to interpret the peculiarities here outlined as "German (economic) nationalism." A number of accusations can certainly be stamped "return to sender."

A further factor is that the Federal Republic of Germany no longer has any really effective spokesman in the West. There is a lack of people capable of explaining the German position in terms of the concepts on the basis of which debate is conducted.

This is a tricky issue, yet one on which plain speaking is indispensable.

Chancellor Kohl is in an outstanding position in this connection, but he is not given to taking part in discussions with facts, with irony or even with pleasure.

Foreign Minister Genscher is increasingly felt to be a man who keeps to his own agenda, an agenda that does not include the issues raised here.

Neither Finance Minister Stoltenberg nor Economic Affairs Minister Bangemann has made it his business to explain the German position to others — or to explain international viewpoints to Germans.

Bundesbank governor Karl Otto Pöhl can best be said to have done so, but he may often have been too keen to defend the central bank's autonomy, important

Continued on page 6

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Find suppliers and products, send

FINANCE

Pessimism over Gatt likely to boost idea of Pacific trading bloc

Most Pacific Basin states have heralded their economic growth. Much has been written and said about this "Pacific powerhouse".

It is an economic bloc in the making which, in terms of population and economic potential, might turn out to be even more significant than the post-1992 European Community and its single internal market.

There has been specific discussion of the United States and Japan setting up a free trade zone.

The idea was first mooted by the Americans. For a long time, the Japanese did not take the ideas seriously. But now they are changing their mind.

A variety of arguments can be marshaled in support of setting up a Pacific free trade zone. One is that overall expectations of the likely outcome of the Gatt Uruguay Round are extremely pessimistic.

Both Japan and the United States view the merger of the European Community countries, with their target of a single internal market, with considerable mistrust, fearing the Europeans may batten down the hatches and cut themselves off in trade policy terms from the rest of the world.

Much that has been heard of late in Brussels seems to fuel the fires of these fears. So setting up an American-Japanese free trade area would possibly be an effective counter-measure.

It might both prevent the European Community from pitching its tariff barriers too high and speed up negotiations to break down tariff barriers within the Gatt framework.

Yet it would be a mistake to imagine that plans for a Pacific free trade zone were merely a reaction to the growing strength of the European Community.

There have been many trade policy clashes between the United States and Japan in recent years, often accompanied by strong words, such as talk of a semiconductor war, and endless legislative bids along protectionist lines in the United States.

This is mainly because the two leading economies of the Western world have been trying not to settle disputes by generally valid rules but to discuss and resolve them individually.

There have thus been juicy disputes over citrus fruit, beef, electronic components, cigarettes and shipping rates, to name but a handful.

Yet all this hue and cry must not blind us to the fact that America and Japan have, with very few exceptions (such as on rice), always agreed on terms.

The fewer disputed issues that remain, the greater will be the incentive to follow countless individual provisions with wider-ranging agreements.

We must bear in mind that ties between America and Japan are very much closer than many people imagine in other parts of the world.

It isn't merely a matter of economic considerations; defence and many other political issues are also involved.

But the strongest common interest must surely be in developing and marketing new technologies, such as data processing and telecommunication, new materials and biotechnology.

The advantages of a free trade zone

Frankfurter Allgemeine
STADT UND WIRTSCHAFT

are felt by its supporters in both countries to include its stabilising political effect.

Here too the reality has in some respects made further progress than might, from a distance, appear to have been the case.

The US defence concept for the Pacific has, for instance, long been backed up by deliberate moves in Japanese development aid aimed at preventing individual island republicies, of which the region has dozens, from opening up to the East Bloc.

The more what has already been accomplished is included in deliberations on the subject, the likelier and more realistic a prospect an American-Japanese free trade zone appears.

That having been said, neither in the United States nor in Japan does it have nothing but supporters.

In both countries numerous economists and politicians have voiced fears that closer ties might force them to abandon independence and open up to alien influences more than they have done in the past.

There can nonetheless be no denying that Japan too is now serious about giving serious consideration to the possibilities of such a far-reaching link.

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The advantages of a free trade zone

Trade and Industry, are busy weighing up the prospects and risks.

In the United States views and facts are being compiled for a Senate subcommittee. What then happens will depend to no small extent on the result of the US Presidential elections.

The Republican candidate, Vice-President George Bush, is known to be a supporter of the free trade zone proposal.

If Treasury Secretary James Baker were to be a member of a Bush administration it would then include a pioneer of the proposal and stand a fair chance of speeding up the pace.

Premier Takeshiita of Japan is known to be as keen a supporter of setting up a comprehensive free trade zone comprising the two countries as his predecessor, Mr Nakasone, was.

How long might it take for the proposal to be put into practice? Views at present seem to vary widely, depending on the assessment of opposition to the idea that inevitably exists in both countries.

There is no talk yet of specific negotiations, but that could quickly change if Mr Bush were to win the Presidential elections.

Then it is generally assumed, there would be at least two years of negotiations.

Bearing in mind the need to ratify the terms agreed, an American-Japanese free trade zone would be unlikely to come into effect before the mid-1990s.

Peter Odrih

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
für Deutschland, 10 September 1988)

Malaysian PM brings his case to Bonn

This year is expected to be well over seven per cent, after 5.2 per cent in 1987.

The manufacturing sector alone has reported a growth rate of 14 per cent.

Much of the growth is due to higher private spending. In the first eight months of this year private investment was up eightfold on the corresponding period of 1987.

Growing export earnings ease the burden of the budget of payments, which is currently in surplus to the tune of six billion Malaysian dollars, or roughly DM4.2bn.

His government planned to continue with its present policy come what may, the Malaysian Premier said. A wide-ranging privatisation programme was due to live off government holdings, especially in transport and services.

So far Kuala Lumpur has privatised 14 state-owned firms, including a container terminal, the national airline, a shipping company and other infrastructure carrier.

Explanations may still be needed on Malaysian domestic affairs, but the economic statistics speak for themselves.

The Malaysian economy has flourished since Kuala Lumpur decided to encourage the private sector. Growth

German question

Continued from page 5

tant though that may be. It is not for the Opposition leader to defend the government's record.

Besides, the "German nationalism" here analysed is not one of his favourite issues.

What is more, there is a shortage nowadays of unofficial spokesmen for the Federal Republic too.

There are various reasons why, one of which brings us back to the initial remarks on Central Europe and allied topics.

German fascination with the West has cooled off, and a great deal of energy is invested in the East.

German politicians, intellectuals and even businessmen are at times so interested, and understandably interested, in trends in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that they tend to neglect the very groundwork from which they operate.

The few who still feel duty bound to explain in Paris, London and Washington what is happening in Germany are too weak to introduce the results of their travels into the German public debate.

None of this need lead to dramatic conclusions; at least, not yet. No-one with both feet on the ground can doubt that the Federal Republic is firmly committed to the West.

No-one who can read economic statistics will doubt that the German economy is inseparably interlinked with the international economy and, in particular, with the OECD market.

Yet it would do no harm if questions asked of Germans by a number of people in the West today were taken to heart and answered.

No-one who can read economic statistics will doubt that the German economy is inseparably interlinked with the international economy and, in particular, with the OECD market.

They keep trade in them to a minimum.

Since the early 1980s futures and op-

Tions trading has boomed breathtakingly on international stock markets. The trend is partly due to futures making it possible to hedge against currency or interest-rate risks.

The demand for provisions of this kind has increased since the system of fixed exchange rates collapsed and financial markets were deregulated.

In the wake of the 1973 oil price rises, for instance, interest rates soared to unprecedented heights, while the dollar exchange rate has been up and down like a yo-yo throughout the 1980s.

Conventional insurance cover is not available for risks of this kind because claims, when they come, come thick and fast. They thus defy actuarial assessment and cannot be costed.

Futures trading solves the problem. It is a form of speculation that, in the words of the song, "makes the world go round."

The speculator runs the risk in much the same way as an insurer does. If his assessment of the situation is right, he will make a handsome profit. If not, he will lose, and may lose heavily.

A consortium of German banks this summer set up a German futures market holding company, *Deutsche Terminbörse GmbH*. It plans to start by trading in options on securities.

There are further fears that futures market makers may soon end up as an oligopoly because, ostensibly in order to ensure investor safeguards, security provisions are so strict that smaller banks and dealers cannot compete.

Dealers in futures used to be permitted on German stock markets, but they were largely prohibited in 1931. Speculation, the very essence of the market, was vilified on political grounds and in connection with a number of scandals that came to light at the time.

Futures trading was resumed in 1970 in the form of options. But the legal position is so fraught with uncertainty that many German banks are most reluctant to handle options.

These two indices clearly indicate the lie of the land. There used to be no such representative German stock market index. But there now is.

Dax, short for *Deutscher Aktien-Index*, was launched on 1 July.

The problem was not a lack of German indices. Critics used to claim, with some truth, that there were more indices than shares traded.

Yet an index such as the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* share index will continue to make sense. It reflects the state of the Stuttgart market, a regional market with features that are strictly its own.

Nationally, however, the situation remains chaotic. There are individual stock market indices, national and financial newspaper indices and indices maintained by banks and the Federal Statistics Bureau. Each competes against the rest; none has gained full and general acceptance.

Now futures trading is planned on the German stock market by the end of next year, agreement on a generally accepted index has been forced upon the market.

Futures trading in securities and bonds presupposes an index that is both generally accepted and internationally acceptable.

As soon as legislation has been drafted and approved, futures contracts will be possible both for individual share quotations and for stock exchange indices.

Experience in neighbouring Switzerland has also shown that a futures market must be accompanied by a reform of conventional stock market dealing.

Deutsche Bank director Rolf-E. Breuer, the driving force behind the futures market project, sees it as the cornerstone of a fully-fledged stock market reform.

A reform of after-hours trading has, for instance, been long overdue. It involves a head-on clash of interests, with dealers calling for longer stock market opening hours and Herr Breuer for one advocating computer trading to make after-hours trading more "transparent" and to upgrade its legal status.

Institutional investors could then trade after hours, which they are not at present permitted to do. Conventional dealers would then stand to lose much of their business.

German stock exchanges, currently in the throes of modernisation costing hundreds of millions of marks, would then be left with cost-intensive trading on behalf of individual investors.

The debate on this and other aspects may delay the opening of a German futures market, but open it will.

Whether in London or in Frankfurt, German investors will soon be able to trade in the future, and to do so in entirely new dimension.

Benedikt Fehl

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 15 September 1988)

FINANCE

Banking consortium sets up a futures market

As the interests of leading market operators, as opposed to the small fry, are largely identical, there will arguably be a strong likelihood of nothing but buyers or sellers being around at any given time.

Swiss experience has shown that this problem cannot be satisfactorily solved by requiring market makers to buy or sell at any time on demand.

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(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 15 September 1988)

First there was chaos; then came Dax followed by Rex

When the Dow-Jones Index plummets on Wall Street or the Nikkei Index soars in Tokyo, stock exchange dealers and pundits all over the world have a clear and immediate pointer to the state of the US or Japanese market.

These two indices clearly indicate the lie of the land. There used to be no such representative German stock market index. But there now is.

Dax, short for *Deutscher Aktien-Index*, was launched on 1 July.

The problem was not a lack of German indices. Critics used to claim, with some truth, that there were more indices than shares traded.

The Dax 30 are a fair cross-section of German commerce and industry. They include 30 per cent chemicals, 16 per cent banks and 13 per cent motor manufacturers.

Then come utilities (12 per cent), steel (eight per cent), electrical engineering (eight per cent), mechanical engineering (four per cent), transport (3.5 per cent) and department stores and insurance (just over two per cent each).

Dax takes into account nearly 60 per cent of the nominal capital of German public limited companies and over 80 per cent of shares traded on the German stock market.

It will prove invaluable during the hue and cry of stock exchange dealings between 11.30 a.m. and 1.30 p.m.

From mid-October a notice-board five metres wide and two metres high will display the Dax Index on the floor of the Frankfurt stock exchange.

■ ARCHAEOLOGY

Separating fact from fiction in the hunt for Homer and Troy

There is something magical attached to Troy, a name linked more to myth, nostalgia and fantasy than to solid fact.

Since Heinrich Schliemann discovered the supposed location of Homer's Trojan War in 1870, scientific knowledge about the site has been fragmentary.

For this reason Troy, lying on a fertile plain south of Çanakkale on the Dardanelles, is one of the best researched archaeological sites in the world.

After Schliemann (1870-1890) his collaborator Wilhelm Dörpfeld (1890-1894) continued with the excavation, as well as the American Carl W. Blegen (1932-1938). There were frequent sensational finds, but Troy has still not yielded up all its secrets.

Car maker Daimler-Benz has provided DM1.3 million for a new excavation campaign, that should extend over 20 years.

The excavation is led by Professor Manfred Korfmann, 46, an authority in pre- and early history.

He has been licensed by the Turkish authorities to continue the investigations that have been carried out at the Troy site for 150 years, with an international team of scientists and in association with a number of specialised disciplines, extending from the computer sciences to philology, botany to geo-physics.

This all costs money. Professor Korfmann has estimated that DM1300,000 a year is needed.

Tübingen University has provided DM250,000 for the past five years. The support from Daimler-Benz has done more than help Professor Korfmann out of a tight spot; it has made it possible to begin excavations this summer.

The firm has also donated a special earth-moving vehicle named "Archimog," that can dig, bore, scoop up earth and transport everything needed on the site.

After the first five-year period Daimler-Benz will consider further assistance if Tübingen University is not in a position to finance the lengthy excavations.

The Daimler-Benz executive board is already looking at its support for the Troy dig for Korfmann is extending his responsibilities in Troy way beyond those of the purely archaeological.

He wants to maintain the ruins on the Hisarlik Hill, whose history stretches back to 2800 BC, so that it is easily available to visitors (there are about 300,000 a year) and they are able appreciate their significance more.

Visitors have caused a lot of damage. They have climbed over the ruins of the walls indiscriminately and riven tracks across the site.

The various levels, from the pre-historic to the Hellenistic-Roman period, are identified as Troy I to Troy IX.

There are no explanations of the various building periods and the "proper" paths through the ruins are not marked. So far only one has been found on the Troy site. There has been no written evidence found at Troy so far.

Was there a Trojan War? Korfmann said: "There were many Trojan wars."

Schliemann had believed that the lowest level had to be cleared away to find the Homeric Troy, the Troy destroyed by the Achaeans. But before he died in 1890 he had doubts whether he had found the correct path.

It is true that Troy I, built on bare rocks about 2800 BC, is not very impressive compared with later building phases.

Korfmann used the deep trenches,

which Schliemann had first dug through the site, at the lowest depths as an approach road for the special archaeological vehicle he has, "Archimog".

In the upper sections, in the very heart of Troy's two oldest settlement phases, he has begun to make the excavations safe so that they could be retained for the future.

Archaeological excavation has become much more sophisticated than it was in Schliemann's time. Although he was a pioneer of a science that was then little known, his methods were very destructive and some enormous mistakes were made.

Korfmann discovered at the Schliemann excavations the remains of two graves. He is now speculating whether these two graves are the last traces of a burial ground that his great predecessor could have destroyed.

He is also speculating whether archaeological finds that Schliemann made on this spot could have originally been burial objects. This would not only alter the topography of Troy, as it is understood to date, but also make corrections to the significance of the finds made there.

In *The Iliad* Homer described the Trojan War as a dispute between the Greeks and the Trojans. If the tourist guides are to be believed the Trojan mounds are still to be seen, there lies Ajax, there beside one another Achilles and Patroclus, there Hector.

Below the entrance to the Dardanelles (and not, as Homer mistakenly reported, at the Scamander estuary), during Troy's great period, the ships had to lie in the Besik Bay and wait for the more favourable autumn winds. The crews camped on land and went no further.

The Hissarlik cliffs were possibly already settled in neolithic times. In prehistoric times, then, the earliest "Trojans," seeing the ships bobbing up and down in the Bay, fell upon the crews: one is coming or going.

With this special surveying equipment it is possible to register deviations in the normal strength of the magnetic field on the ground and so reveal that hidden from sight, there are stone roadways, sewage pipes and humus soil, signifying that there was an extensive lower part of the town.

Several areas have been exposed revealing very wide Roman roads, surfaced roadways, houses, fountains, a whole, once flourishing, civic organisation.

It was known that a Novum Ilium was established in ancient times, but no-one knew what the city looked like. Professor Korfmann will uncover more of this area over the next few years and develop a kind of open-air museum.

According to Korfmann, in the time of Troy VI, 400 ships could easily have pulled in there to be fleeced by the troublesome Trojans.

It is no surprise that time and again, and not only in 1250 BC, the period of Homer's great heroes, the arriving seafarers defended themselves and even stormed the coveted fortress of Troy or Ilium, and perhaps used it for themselves as their predecessors had done.

And it would also not be surprising that a whole body of robber and hero legends were associated with Troy, long before Homer sang so artistically about the long-forgotten times 500 years later, if there was such a person as Homer and if he alone wrote *The Iliad* which the latest scholarship again accepts.

Archaeologists come on bizarre discoveries even today. A hundred years ago Schliemann identified the Hisarlik Hill as the site of Troy with the help of information of the locality provided by Frank Calvert, British by birth but the American vice-consul who owned part of the Hisarlik mound; Dörpfeld who unearthed the imposing walls of Troy VI and also Carl Blegen, whose careful and cautious excavations in the 1930s went towards a subtly differentiated understanding of Troy -- but they were all pre-

impressive. It is supposed that Homer's Troy was the splendid Troy VI, with its marvellous hewn stones that can be seen still. It collapsed in 1250 BC -- the result of an earthquake? Or from the blows of a ram? The British journalist and historian Michael Wood suggested in his book *The War for Troy* that such war machines were the origin of the Trojan Horse legend.

Korfmann's research so far at Besik Tepe, south-west of Troy, indicates that Troy's wealth came from its geographic position.

The narrow waters of the Dardanelles, the only access to the Marmara Sea from the Aegean, could only be navigated with difficulty because of the strength of the winds and the current.

In summer, up to the time of Christ's birth at least, it was impossible to pass through. The ships of that time did not have a keel and could not tack against the wind. In summer a north wind still blows so that one does not know whether one is coming or going.

Below the entrance to the Dardanelles (and not, as Homer mistakenly reported, at the Scamander estuary), during Troy's great period, the ships had to lie in the Besik Bay and wait for the more favourable autumn winds. The crews camped on land and went no further.

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The evidence of the remains of Troy VI below the Roman strata might well be sensational. They indicate that the fortress was once a dominating citadel. Below there was a settlement of people who were ruled by the inhabitants of the citadel, but at present it is not known to what extent.

In future differentiations must be made between the fortress of Troy (Korfmann uses the word acropolis) and the town or village of Troy.

The whole of Troy still holds finds that should correct our reading of history. Korfmann plans to devote his life's work to the area. He knows that to the south there is the ancient enormous, unexcavated city of Alexandria Troas.

Its population was 100,000, an Aegean metropolis that more than once was within a hair's breadth of becoming the capital of the Roman Empire.

Today stones and graves can be seen a few centimetres above the earth among the olive trees and grass.

The harbour can still be seen with ancient bollards and the remains of the quay wall, and the old quarry in the foothills of Mount Ida.

Christel Heybroek
(Mannheimer Morgen, 6 September 1988)



A life's work. Archaeologist Korfmann at Troy. (Photo: AP)

■ FILMS

And so to the bedroom hero who becomes a deserter

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Schwebandes Liebespaar. They are totally immersed in each other.

Transitoriness and futility hang threateningly over the flightful-beautiful couple, who are placed in an "ideal-home-like" apartment, that is like a cave for them.

The fate of the night wanderer is to become an "inhabitant of a cave" under the paw of the mother animal, but he wants to escape from this mouse-trap. The bedroom hero becomes a deserter.

But where to go? The "compulsive romantic," as an analyst colleague describes him, goes wandering again. He goes out of the cave-apartment into the cityscape at night.

As if controlled by magical power a man and a woman race murderously towards each other and blindly exchange the expensive shell of their ears that crunch together for the hard surface of the black-shining asphalt.

There is the promising sound of waltz music and deceptive happiness. The master of the house's seventh wedding is like an infringement against the purity laws.

The submissive bride is already laughing at the indecencies of the unknown guest who is whispering in her ear.

It is an attempt to make contact that comes to a standstill with a frozen smile at a souvenir photo.

Dream or reality? The stranger comes into the apartment in an uninhibited manner, telephones from the bedroom, gets to know six women, who had been married before, and flirts with the bride's young sister — and becomes unexpectedly a key player.

The calculative power of a frivolous fantasy dominates. It does not determine anything but it branches out into paths in the night and just obeys a director's instructions: it's men's fantasies.

Robert Van Ackeren envisaged his latest film project as "the portrayal of a large, beautiful, but weak woman, who carries a small, strong man in her hands."

These are men's fantasies, run to clichés, supplied with ironic bon mots, controlled by programmatic key phrases — no way out for miles around for Max.

The circular form of the film, which after any number of capers ends with a new Max and Marie couple, shows once again the powerlessness of an author who went out into the world to use men's fantasies for himself, but in the end he is his own victim and the victim of men's fantasies.

These are hyper-realistic scenes from a polished photographer, Jürgen Jürges.

They follow on after one another like pearls from an arsenal of exquisite pictures, full of sparkle, full of ideas and subtlety. But despite everything the whole fireworks display leaves one indifferent.

Perhaps the embittered efforts annoy in trying to unmask the self-deceptions



Pub crawl and erotic encounters in *Die Venusfalle*. (Photo: Filmverlag der Autoren)

The anatomy of a voice — and much more

Kieler Nachrichten

Director Doris Dörrie has made her first English-language film, a satirical comedy called *Me and Him*.

A minor employee in a New York architect's office, played by 35-year-old Griffin Dunne, suddenly starts getting advice from an unexpectedly vocal portion of his anatomy.

Sticking up for its rights, his organ insists on discussing matters of policy, priorities and romance. And the *Him* insists on doing this while Dunne is trying to work in the office.

Dörrie said that it was "a comedy about men and women and the small differences between them."

Him is never seen but he talks incessantly (Heiner Lauterbach provides the voice in the German version, one of the main actors in Dörrie's highly successful *Men*).

The conversations the *Him* character has with *Me* can be heard by the audience but not by the other characters in the film.

The *Me* character is married and wants to get on at work. To his wife's vexation, he is obsessed with his career.

The *Him* complains about the excessive boredom over the past few years of his master's love life.

The character *Him* tries to make his boss pay more attention to the female sex and enjoy life more.

Producer Bernd Eichinger took the basic idea for the film from a novel by Alberto Moravia, about a man "in the trap of a overpowering sex life." Warren D. Leight's script is "a very free" adaption of the Moravia tale.

The film was shot in New York. After a witty start Dörrie creates many splendidly ironical scenes, but she does not maintain the tempo of the idea. Some of it is idiotic and rubbishy.

But what is worse, it is boring. The basic idea cannot be sustained throughout the length of the film.

There is little of New York's atmosphere in the film; and the few allusions made to local building speculators mean little to anyone else except New Yorkers.

But the portrayals, the anxieties of the "hire and fire" system in the American working world well, *Wifited Monstert* (Kiel Nachrichten, 13 September 1988)



The basic idea cannot be sustained in *Me and Him*. (Photo: Neue Constantin Film)

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

A Land contemplates with anger an engulfing tide of industrial waste

Nowhere in Germany has garbage posed such serious political problems as in Hesse, the first *Land* to talk in terms of a waste-disposal "state of emergency."

Hesse was the first *Land* in Germany to envisage limits to industrial production because of waste-disposal congestion.

In Hesse the party whip was ignored both when the Social Democrats and Greens held power and, now the Christian and Free Democrats are in coalition in Wiesbaden, whenever the coalition agree on waste tip sites and local government politicians do their damnest to thwart the decision.

Court injunctions have been awarded twice in Hesse to halt the construction of large-scale modern waste dumps that had already cost millions.

But Hesse is not on its own. These are all problems with which other *Länder* are increasingly confronted.

It is not that "chaos" is particularly rife in Hesse, as was alleged in the days of the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens.

It is merely that the trend toward waste disposal crisis imminent in all industrialised countries is more advanced in Hesse.

The municipal health and economic affairs department in Zürich, Switzerland, raised the overall problem only a few days ago.

After talking with 50 local authorities in the Zürich waste disposal area, Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer says manufacturers and retailers will be required to accept and recycle empties. Deposits on normal glass bottles vary between 15 pfennigs and 30 pfennigs. As Wolfgang Borgmann writes in this article for the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, this heavy deposit shows that the minister has decided to take on an industrial giant, Coca-Cola.

The upshot was that Zürich now has to export its surplus garbage to northern France.

In August the UN environmental programme raised the problem of an "increase by leaps and bounds" in toxic waste exports over the past few years.

The OECD countries alone, and they include Western Europe, Canada and the United States, Japan and Australia, were said to export 500,000 tonnes of toxic waste a year, including 300,000 tonnes from Western Europe to Eastern Europe.

These figures nowhere near adequately illustrate the brisk trade in waste exported to the developing countries.

By next March a UN convention is to be drafted that will end this practice. Yet "special waste" is steadily increasing in quantity, partly due to progressively more rigorous environmental regulations.

An increasing number of substances that occur in industrial production are classified as toxic, as being poorly biodegradable or as being unpredictable in chemical compounds.

They can thus no longer be legally dumped on domestic garbage tips.

Convenient and inexpensive waste disposal procedures of the past, such as pumping effluent into the sea, are progressively being ruled out by tougher legislation and official regulations adopted in the wake of steadily more alarming health hazards, including the death of North Sea seals and fish, the proliferation of algae and the discovery

of salmonella bacteria in seawater on holiday resort beaches.

Above all, high-tech environmental technology may desulphurise static emission, purify sewage and incinerate waste but it also produces highly toxic residual waste of its own that adds to the mountains of "special," that is, toxic, waste.

In Hesse the present 260,000 tonnes of special waste a year that local authorities are legally bound to dispose of is expected to increase by nearly a quarter to 320,000 tonnes a year.

This figure does not even include the waste of which industry itself disposes, such as the 40,000 tonnes of toxic waste that Hoechst, the Frankfurt chemicals company, incinerates annually in its own disposal facilities.

This burgeoning burden of toxic waste faces far too inadequate waste disposal facilities that are often badly in need of modernisation.

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tonnes to the Rhineland-Palatinate. Work is naturally still going ahead on waste dump projects and new waste disposal concepts. The annual capacity of the new incinerator at Biebesheim is to be increased by 30,000 to 90,000 tonnes.

A new incinerator is planned to handle further 30,000 tonnes of toxic waste a year, but no-one knows when and where it will be built; local authorities will have nothing to do with it.

Underground storage capacity for high-grade toxic waste at Hermsdorf, near Kassel, is to be increased from 120,000 to 240,000 tonnes a year. Hoechst are to increase the capacity of their own incinerator from 40,000 to 100,000 tonnes a year.

Sewage sludge must inevitably, or so it would see, be exported to East Germany until a further incinerator goes on-line.

This year an estimated 40,000 tonnes of sludge will be shipped to East Germany.

The *Land* government sets most store just as its SPD-Green predecessor did, by the Mainhausen waste dump, half built at a cost of nearly DM60m and scheduled to process about 120,000 tonnes of toxic waste a year from 1990.

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Minister takes on Coca-Cola and plastic bottles

The 1986 Waste Disposal Act is, in his view, a cautious regulator within the limits of the social free-market economy.

It provides for a mandatory attempt to reach voluntary agreement, failing which regulations may be imposed, but only with Cabinet approval.

Herr Töpfer says, and his claim rings true, that he has tried and failed to negotiate a voluntary agreement.

He is not opposed to plastic as such. He has even called on the soft drinks industry to develop a refillable plastic bottle, but none yet exists.

He wants to ensure that the existing system of returning empty bottles is not abandoned. It is still, he says, the best means of preventing waste from being produced in the first place.

He has proposed a punitive 50-pfennig compulsory deposit on plastic bottles to make a return to the carefree and irresponsible days of no deposit, no return as expensive as possible.

Social Democratic and Green critics doubt whether this deposit is enough. They feel absolute priority must be given to reusable glass bottles and are opposed, as a matter of principle, to a new system that will impose a heavier burden on the waste disposal system.

Coca-Cola has sounded a clarion call by proposing to launch a larger non-returnable plastic bottle. As a clarion call it was surely a mistake.

Herr Töpfer is hard-pressed from both sides, by industrial and by political critics. But as the middle-of-the-road and common-sense man he feels himself to be this state of affairs does not upset him unduly.

He is a staunch supporter of the free-market economy and sees himself as

In order to ensure that Mainhausen is environmentally fit and legally "water-tight" a technological innovation is planned.

The largest freely-suspended awnings in Europe are envisaged as keeping the tip dry and preventing toxic liquid from seeping into the ground water.

The bed of the tip is to be lined like a bathtub, sealed and fitted out with drainage facilities costing a further DM60m.

Yet political objections continue to be raised. Both the regional planning assembly of South Hesse, in which Social Democrats and Greens command a majority, and the Christian Democratic mayor of Mainhausen, Dieter Grönig, plan to oppose a fresh planning application by the *Land* government.

The situation looks no more promising where domestic waste disposal is concerned. From 1990 over one million tonnes of waste a year will be surplus to the processing capacity of 43 local authorities in the Frankfurt area, with an aggregate population of 1,500,000.

What can the *Land* government do in the circumstances?

Herr Weimar, who as Environment Minister will have no choice but to export domestic waste from South Hesse to East Germany and to France, has threatened to serve notice to local authorities.

He will remind them that they are under a legal waste disposal obligation. "My patience is not slightly exhausted," he says. "But I am at the end of my tether."

Dankwart Güratzsch

(Die Welt, Bonn, 14 September 1988)

acting in strict accordance with European Community guidelines.

He has no fears of Coca-Cola taking its ease to the European Court of Justice. He says he isn't thinking in terms of a ban yet isn't prepared to rule one out — presumably a finer tactical point.

Klaus Töpfer v. Coca-Cola looks like being an attractive bout. Herr Töpfer sounds confident of success, feeling sure of public support and, no less importantly, of Chancellor Kohl's backing at least on this issue.

He has no intention of creating the impression that he plans consistently to give ecological aspects preference over industrial considerations. He is far too realistic to have any such idea in mind.

He has expressly noted that industry must grow accustomed to paying greater heed to environmental considerations, but in his view the latest move against Coca-Cola and others must be the exception, not the rule.

He also notes that he recently persuaded battery manufacturers to agree to largely voluntary terms. They have undertaken to reduce substantially the amount of toxic substances used in dry cells, to take back used batteries and to recycle them. He is still confident that voluntary agreements will prevail in environmental protection. That certainly isn't the wrong approach.

What one wonders is whether the realisation that something needs to be done, a realisation that definitely exists to some degree, is sufficiently widespread in industry.

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■ THE HUMAN MIND

Intellect more a matter of perspiration than inherited inspiration, tests show

Genius is merely a significant tendency toward talent, as a French aphorism has it. Empirical psychology has come to much the same conclusion.

Perseverance and motivation are more important than extremes of talent for feats of intellectual achievement.

Psychologists have abandoned the view that top-flight intellectual accomplishments are mainly due to hereditary aptitude or talent, particularly a high IQ.

This change of mind is outlined by Wolfgang Schneider of the Max Planck Psychological Research Institute, Munich, writing in the 3/88 issue of *Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht*.

But a particularly important feature they all shared was that they became keen scientists after initial successes that made them virtually dedicate their lives enthusiastically and persistently to research.

Beginners also piece "chunks" together, but their chunks tend to consist of far fewer pieces. The greater ability to recognise chess "patterns" is what enables master-players to beat several weaker opponents simultaneously.

How important chunk creation is among experts is shown by a comparison between experienced 10-year-old chess players and adult newcomers to the game.

The experienced youngsters were far superior to older newcomers when it came to memorising positional play, but not where memorising chess problems was concerned.

Talented specialised knowledge, Schneider says, can even offset the lack of general talent — up to a point.

He arrived at this conclusion from a research project of his own in which he asked third- to seventh-grade schoolchildren questions testing their football memories.

The experienced youngsters were far superior to older newcomers when it came to memorising positional play, but not where memorising chess problems was concerned.

Talented specialised knowledge, Schneider says, can even offset the lack of general talent — up to a point.

They must be offered genuine challenges that call for hard work if they are to be handled successfully — and could well defuse tension.

Rolf Degen

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 8 September 1988)

Süddeutsche Zeitung

A creative impulse and a degree of motivation, stamina and determination to succeed are also needed.

This viewpoint is supported for one by an analysis of the lives of 64 outstanding scientists. Most, if not all of them, boasted above-average intelligence, Schneider says.

Chess experts have been found to have a repertoire of roughly 50,000 positions they can put to immediate use when the need arises, whereas good club players can only memorise about 1,000.

The chess "greats" evidently memorise them in chunks. They memorise larger and larger chunks for future reference, making it easier to learn more.

Where beginners have to work their short-term memories flat-out, experts have no difficulty in deploying their stockpile of positional play "chunks."

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■ THE HUMAN MIND

Over-ambitious parents 'likely to ruin bright child's ability'

Parents, psychologists and teachers often interpret certain quirks of behaviour and listlessness at school as signs of children being extremely gifted.

In reality only about 20 per cent of children are gifted — defined as a combination of intellectual flexibility, an extremely good memory, originality and an IQ of over 130.

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■ SOCIETY

Mincing steps in the Blankenese Polonaise, but no mincing words

More than 30,000 people, 70 per cent women, belong to the 200 branches of the Grey Panthers, a pressure group set up in 1975 to help old people fight for rights for themselves. It was founded by Helmut and Trude Unruh and 177 others. Esther Knorr-Anders went to the Panthers' Culture Centre in Oberbarmen, Wuppertal, and reports for the Hamburg weekly, *Die Zeit*.

A six-foot man with dark glasses and a grey beard was the sole figure on the station concourse. It was Helmut Unruh, the first of many Grey Panthers I was to meet.

We got into his car and drove to Oberbarmen. The road followed the River Wupper for a while. From time to time a train on Wuppertal's famous overhead railway went by.

We arrived at the Grey Panther Culture Centre at Oberbarmen, a building surrounded by trees.

I was greeted by Trude Unruh, the movement's first chairwoman. She has curly, blonde hair, an open expression and a firm hand grip.

She has no time for small talk and regards herself as a "campaigner against political cynicism and official obfuscation."

The building was full of people for the regular Wednesday afternoon meeting. These meetings are open to members and non-members alike. Many Grey Panthers from branches in other cities come to Wuppertal for them.

There was much discussion and no-one minded words; but it wasn't all hard work — there was dancing and laughter as well.

If I were a member of the Bundestag, party would not matter, I would be scared thinking about where I would be in the year 2000.

Elderly people, as an independent voting sector of society, could fundamentally affect the political balance of power with their increasing influence.

Trude Unruh, with husband Helmut and 177 others, founded the Grey Panther movement 13 years ago. The Panthers are not all old and grey. Some are young.

Panthers are untiringly active in social affairs, whether young or old, rich or poor.

They stage demonstrations in cities where scandals about old people's and nursing homes have hit the headlines.

They have taken up the cudgels for pensions for the *Trümmerfrauen*, the women who cleared away rubble after bombing raids in the last war. There are no pensions for these women.

Six years ago the Greens were the only party to commit themselves to representing Grey Panther pension reforms in the Bundestag.

In doing this they demonstrated farsightedness, for by the year 2000 about 25 per cent of the population will be over 65, representing a formidable political power group in society.

The Greens quickly arranged for the up-to-then non-party Trude Unruh to take a seat in the Greens fraction in the Bundestag.

A choir prepared to sing a prelude to the opening of the afternoon meeting. Hedi Kepner conducted one of her own compositions with her own words about taxes, debts and the salaries of elected

representatives with spirit. What the Panthers sing must have an echo in the corridors of power in Bonn and every state parliament.

Finally guests from Aachen addressed the meeting. They reported about conditions in old people's and nursing homes and on pilot schemes for alternative housing and mutual assistance neighbourhood projects.

Once more the point was made that men and women did not worry so much about an inadequate pension as about residence in a home, anxiety about being locked away in barrack-like accommodation, being patronised and losing their identity. These points are constantly being raised.

There is also, of course, the fear of living in a nursing home to die alone.

The Grey Panthers try to acquire housing, to rent apartments and, an ultimate goal, set up community villages where members can spend the rest of their lives.

A sociology student got up and he was offered the microphone. His very first words might have caused consternation among his audience. Nothing of the sort. The Grey Panthers listened calmly.

Their amused smiles should have been a warning to the 23-year-old man. He said that he knew old people who would not even once get the breakfast coffee ready for themselves. He said that they should get used to doing so.

"From early morning onwards they wanted to be given attention, while they just shuffled about," he said. He imitated the way the infirm walked.

The Panthers laughed. Perhaps they were weighing up just how long a dissembling demagogue would need to convince such a young man that the state should kill off people over 60.

The succeeding generation would be relieved of tiresome duties. The young would be able to go their own way unimpeded.

Fräulein Unruh took on the zealot. She politely but firmly ticked him off, telling him that he was caught up in his own egocentrism and was astonishingly ill-informed.

She wrote *Mitter*, also published by KlarText Verlag, which is highly critical of traditional approaches to old age.

Totto Heckner, a former bookseller, also read Frau Unruh's book and could think of nothing else "but getting to Wuppertal."

She manages the Culture Centre, where 12 old people are living, each with separate accommodation. They can end the rental contract whenever they like, move out or move back in.

All have had periods of loneliness that made their lives almost unbearable.

Gustav Koberstein was a civil servant. When his wife died he moved into his local old people's home. He hoped that he would be able to get over his wife's death among people of his own age. That was a mistake.

He became depressed. A court removed his rights to control his own personal affairs. He had no trust in the male nurse who looked after him.

But he did have confidence in an elderly lady, Grete, who lived in the home.

In the end he wanted to marry Grete, but she was officially informed in writing that she was forbidden to meet Gustav.

The letter said: "You are again requested to have no contacts with Herr

responsibilities that could eat up more than eight hours a day? Walter Ebenfeld said that he was attracted to the movement because of the wide influence it had and because of the satisfaction in solving problem cases and helping sort out difficulties with government departments. Ebenfeld is a lawyer and educationalist. While he was still studying, he looked after his sick mother for the last three years of her life. He became interested in the Grey Panthers after reading Frau Unruh's book, *Aufsturz zur Rebellion*, published by KlarText Verlag in Essen. He joined. His special responsibilities include medical care, guardianship and out-of-court orders.

There are 3,000 cases a year where old or infirm people are judged incapable of looking after their own affairs and are made wards of court. People must know what they can do to halt this process — often the instigators are relatives who stand to gain financially. Ebenfeld heads an advisory committee.

The Panthers were able to get him reinstated as competent to look after his own affairs. Only well-versed experts can find their way through the legal jungle to do this.

Gustav, again a widower, intends to remain in the Grey Panthers' accommodation until he dies.

Wilhelm Kwas, a miner, could also not come to terms with widowhood. Without his wife to talk to he felt himself to be useless.

He went for walks along the Wupper and listened to the overhead railway rumbling past. He said to himself that there were people in the train who had an aim in life. He had none.

One day he went to the Grey Panther Culture Centre, for no particular reason. It just happened to be on his way.

He did not like the garden. He asked if he could do something about it. He got talking. Someone said to him: "Stay with us. There is an apartment going..."

He lived in the house a year and got to know Heidi there, a lively lady. They have just got married. Wilhelm Kwas invited me to the marriage celebration.

Totto Heckner, dressed in purple from head to foot, was in charge of the arrangements. Sekt corks popped. About 100 people turned up, filling the main hall. The tables were set in white, white candles and there was a riot of white flowers.

The married couple came in. People crowded round them and wished them well. Helmut Unruh made the wedding speech. He was listened to with everyone standing round.

The newly-weds saw it through hand in hand. Gustav, 75, wore a grey suit with a flower in his button-hole. Grete, 65, wore a dark-blue evening dress. They

Continued on page 16



Pensioner power. Trude Unruh and fellow Panthers.

(Photo: Gutz Linzenmeier)

Koberstein. Should you also disregard this request, the court feels itself obliged to take action to compel you to meet this request?"

Grete and Gustav left the home and put themselves under the protection of the Grey Panthers. They were married in 1982 and given accommodation in the Culture Centre.

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Continued on page 16

■ SPORT

Once upon a time there was Little Mo, Rod the Rocket and Steffi

Steffi Graf is only the third woman to win the tennis Grand Slam, which comprises the Australian, French, Wimbledon and United States titles. The others were an Australian, Margaret Smith (later Court), in 1970; and an American, the late Maureen (Little Mo) Connolly, in 1953. Only two men have done it, an American, Donald Budge, in 1938; and an Australian, Rod Laver, Laver, not nick-named The Rocket for nothing, did it twice, in 1962 and 1969. Martina Navratilova did not even do it. She won all championships, but not in a calendar year. With Erika Graf's win in the American Open at Flushing Meadow this month (she beat Gabriela Sabatini, of Argentina, in the final 6-3, 3-6, 6-1) she stamped her mark on world tennis and, at the same time, confirmed the end of the reign of Navratilova at the top of the women's game. In this article for *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, Claus Geissmar looks at Steffi Graf's background, the importance of her close family environment and, in particular, the role of her father, tennis coach Peter Graf. Geissmar, who has been reporting international tennis for 20 years, also looks at Germany's other tennis Wunderkind, Boris Becker, and how he has been affected by success and money; and he draws some conclusions for Graf.

How did it happen? How is it that first, a 17-year-old from Germany becomes the youngest winner of the Wimbledon men's title? And then a 19-year-old girl emerges to win the Grand Slam? Is there a secret for producing tennis champions in the Federal Republic of Germany?

The answer amazes many of my foreign colleagues. It is no. Boris Becker and Steffi Graf are exceptional people who have not been produced through any "system".

The German tennis federation does have training centres at *Land* level, and both Becker and Graf both were coached there earlier in their careers. But their successes cannot be put down to that.

Becker's Wimbledon wins of 1985 and 1986 was based on the deep relationship he had with trainer Günther Bosch and the fact that Bosch was able to develop Becker's extraordinary talents.

The relationship did not merely involve spending the daylight hours being taught forehands and backhands and volleys and smashes. It also involved the coach taking part in pillow fights with a growing 15-, 16- and then 17-year-old in the evening.

The seeds of Graf's Grand Slam contain a comparable human factor — her father, Peter Graf.

Top sportsmen and women are hypersensitive people. Only when the excess of this sensitivity is anchored in secure human terms are they able to bring all their concentration to bear on using their talent and produce the goods. This means for people as young as 16 and 17 a firm relationship.

Little Steffi beamed up at me from a long way below and said: "You can say 'du' (the familiar form of address) to me." She had just celebrated her 15th birthday but felt more 14 than 15. But even then (1984) she managed to reach the last 16.

It was an episode that stands out in my 20 years of reporting Wimbledon for its

sensitivity. Only when the excess of this sensitivity is anchored in secure human terms are they able to bring all their concentration to bear on using their talent and produce the goods. This means for people as young as 16 and 17 a firm relationship.

Stories about Steffi's sheepdogs, Max and Enzo; about her boxer, Ben; or about her enthusiasm for the songs of Bruce Springsteen are peripheral, a small part of the important whole, which is the family environment.

A few years ago, Peter Graf was a man fighting to accelerate the rise of his teenage daughter; he was a difficult man for outsiders to get on with. But since Steffi

has begun following one success with another, Herr Graf has become more equal. His great quality now is that his readiness to let his daughter take time off from tennis, to miss the occasional tournament. Instead of giving in to the ever-present temptation to pick up 100,000 dollars here and another 100,000 dollars there, he lets her put her feet up — the result is that she maintains her enthusiasm and he can count the millions.

Becker long ago became a millionaire several times over as well. But, since his first Wimbledon win in 1985, he has become a different person. He has grown up.

Becker's friendship with Bosch broke up when Benedictine Courtin drifted on to the scene as Boris's first serious girlfriend. Becker, who until this point only thought about winning this match and getting on with the next one, suddenly needed to express his mental and physical energies in a totally different direction. Two hearts were beating inside the same breast.

The immediate result was that his performances declined. Obviously, he remains a brilliant player and he still belongs up there with the best of them. He did, after all, reach the Wimbledon final this year again (losing to Stefan Edberg, of Sweden).

The Wimbledon Centre Court, the

scene of his two great triumphs, instinctively stirred the old feelings in Becker: "I had forgotten how what a good smell freshly cut grass has," he said as he once more stood on the green sward.

He feels most at home here; and his sense of smell only confirmed it (most tournaments are played on artificial surfaces or clay).

Becker's game is best-suited to the grass, which is faster than other surfaces — the big service, for example. But technique alone is not enough if the mood is

not right.

Becker has been successful and he has become rich. So why shouldn't he visit a disco?

After all, the Wimbledon grass will again smell good next year.

Why should he lay himself with blistered feet on the hard surface of Flushing Meadow? Even Björn Borg did not

win a United States Open there, but he still won Wimbledon five times.

This is roughly what is running

through Boris Becker's mind, but he cannot admit it publicly because of the outcry it would cause. The separation from Bosch, the flight to the tax haven in Monte Carlo, his avoidance of call-up into the armed forces, his absence from the Olympics (injured foot) ... he doesn't want to say, on top of this: "Apart from Wimbledon, I couldn't care any more."

That, then, is the internal conflict

which Becker (and the German sporting public) have to live with. But, with Graf, it is much different.

Bosch, then official German tennis

association coach, remembers the 10-year-old when she came to the tennis centre in Hanover.

Bosch: "One thing in particular made

her stand out. When we had played all

the balls, she ran to the bucket so she

could collect them all again quickly. She

just couldn't wait to play again."

It hasn't changed. Today she is the

same, it doesn't matter whether it's the

first round at Amelia Island or the final